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NOINAL CONSIDERATION.
It is said that the law concerning the doctrine of considera-
tion1 is far from being clear, and that the courts are not con-
sistent in their application of the rule. This is certainly true
of that phase of the doctrine dealing with the.adequacy or suf-
ficieny of the consideration. It is with this phase that the pres-
ent article has to do.
Blackstone says of a contract: "It is an agreement, upon a
sufficient consideration. The civilians hold, that in all contracts,
either expressed or implied, there must be something given in
exchange, something that is mutual or reciprocal. This thing,
which is the price or motive of the contract, we call the consid-
eration; and it must be a thing lawful in itself, or else the con-
tract is void. . . . But a contract for any valuable consid-
eration, as for marriage, for money, for work done, or for other
reciprocal contracts, can never be impeached at law; and, if it
be of a sufficient adequate value, is never set aside in equity;
for the person contracted with has then given an equivalent in
recompense, and is therefore as much an owner or creditor, as
and other person."12 Concerning the consideration, he says; "A
consideration of some sort or other is so absolutely necessary to
the forming of a contract, that a nudum pactum, or agreement
to do or pay anything on one side, without any compensation on
the other, is totally void at law; and a man cannot be compelled
to perform it.'' s
From Chitty we learn that, "Even- in equity, although a
consideration be necessary, in the case of an agreement not under
seal,'inadequacy of consideration or value is in general, of itself,
no ground for impeaching a contract. . . . And inequality
of consideration upon entering into an agreement for the com-
promise or abandonment of a doubtful right, will not defeat the
contract. But if the folly of the contract be extremely gross,
this circumstance will tend, if there be other facts in corrobora-
tion, to establish a case for relief on the ground of fraud; but
IHistory of Consideration, Harvard Law Review, volume 2, pp.
1-19, 60-61 and volume 8, pp. 252-264. Two Theories of Consideration,
fbid, volume 12, p. 55, and volume 13, p. 29. Notes on Consideration,
ibid, volume 26, p. 429.
2II Blackstone, p. 444.
'II Blackstone, p. 445.
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mere folly and weakness, or want of judgment, will not defeat
a contract even in equity.' '
In Parsons we find that, "If the consideration is valuable
it need not be adequate; that is, the court will not inquire into
the exact proportion between the value of the consideration
and that of the thing to be done for it. . . . The courts,
both of law and equity, refuse to disturb contracts on questions
of mere adequacy, whether the consideration is of benefit to the
promisor, or of injury to the promisee." Speaking of specific
performance of contracts for the purchase of real estate, he says,
"But a mere inadequacy of price-not gross, and not attended
by circumstances indicating fraud or oppression-is not suf-
ficient to avoid it."6
Concerning specific performance, the statement is made in
Adams7 that, "Where a decree for specific performance is asked,
there must be a valuable consideration to support the equity. A
distinction, however, must be noted between value and adequacy.
It is essential that the consideration be valuable, but it is not
essential that it be also adequate. The parties themselves are
the best judges of that; and therefore mere inadequacy, if not
so gross as to prove fraud or imposition, will not warrant the re-
fusal of relief." 8
Addison, in speaking of inadequacy of consideration, says,"
"The consideration for a simple contract or promise need not be
adequate in point of value. 'If there be any consideration, the
court will not weigh the extent of it.' It has no means of
scrutinizing the varied hidden motives and reasons that may
have influenced the parties, and induced them to enter into the
contract, nor can it determine upon the prudence or propriety
of the transaction. If parties choose to enter into unwise or im-
provident bargains they must abide by the consequences of their
4 Chitty, The Law of Contracts, 5th American edition, p. 31.
'Parsons, Law of Contracts, 5th edition, volume 1, p. 436.
0 Parsons, Law of Contracts, 5th edition, volume 1, p. 492.
TAdams, Doctrine of Equity, pp. 78-79.
8 12 How. (U. S.) 197, where at an execution sale, $600.00 was paid
for certain promissory notes secured by mortgage, amounting to
$260,000, it was held, that mere inadequacy of price does not, of itself,
furnish a sufficient reason for dismsising the bill.
'Addison, Law of Contracts, Morgan's edition, volume 1, p. 31.
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own rashness and folly; they have contracted for themselves,
and the court cannot contract for them."
In Mouton v. Noble,10 it is said: "The requiring of a small
pecuniary consideration to support an agreement is a mere
fiction, unknown to the civil law and to the laws of this state."
That was a Louisiana case where the civil law is followed.
The general rule followed by the law courts is as stated in
13 C. J., under Contract, section 237, "So long as it is something
of real value in the eye of the law, whether or not the considera-
tion is adequate to the promise is generally immaterial in the ab-
sence of fraud. The slightest consideration is sufficient to sup-
port the most onerous obligation." This seems to be supported
by the cases.
"The courts do not ordinarily go into the question of
equality or inequality of consideration, but act upon the pre-
sumption that parties capable to contract are capable of regu-
lating the terms of their contracts, granting relief only when the
inequality is shown to have arisen from mistake, misrepresenta-
tion or fraud. . . . The law looks no further than to see that
the obligation rests upon a consideration; that is, one recognized
as legal, and of some value. It is sufficient if it is of only slight
value or such as can be of value to the promissor."' 1
"Aside from contracts peculiar to the law merchant or the
like, a contract for the exchange of unequal sums of money at
the same time, or at different times, when the element of time is
no equivalent, is not binding at common law; and in such cases,
courts may and do inquire into the equality of the contract." 12
Such was the situation in the case of Schnell v. Nell,13 where it
was held that the consideration of one cent would not support
a promise to pay $600.00; also in the case of Shepard v. Rhodes,14
which held, "Courts do not go into questions of equality or in-
equality of considerations, but a contract for the exchange of
unequal sums of money, when there is no other element in the
transaction that affects the inequality, is not binding; hence a
101 La. Ann. 192.
16 R. C. L. 678.
16 R. C. L. 681.
1 17 Ind. 29, 79 Am. Dec. 453.
14 7 R. I. 470.
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contract to pay $1,000.00 in consideration of $1.00 is not good,
.for want of a sufficient consideration."
In the case of Lindlay v. Raydure,1 5 the court held that "a
consideration of $1.00 is sufficient to support an oil and gas
lease by the terms of which the lessee's interest is subject to
defeasance for breach of condition subsequent to drill wells and
pay royalties, though he is not bound by any covenant to per-
form the condition." In Guffey v. Smith,16 it was said that "the
consideration of the lease, viz., $1.00 paid to the lessor and the
covenants and agreements of the lessee, cannot be pronounced
recited consideration of one dollar is ordinarily sufficient to sup-
unreasonable." Again, in Rohwer v. Burrell,17 it is said that "a
recited consideration of one dollar is ordinarily sufficient to sup-
port a contract or agreement." Rick. v. Doneghey,' s was a case
of an oil and gas lease which recited a consideration of one dol-
lar, and it was there held that one dollar is a sufficient con-
sideration to support a conveyance of land or other agreement.
Tonera v. Henderson,"9 held that "the recital in a deed af 'the
further consideration of five shillings' was in itself sufficient
to support the deed."
Equity will generally follow the common law rule, inquiring
into the equality or inequality of the consideration only when
it would raise a presumption of fraud or when it is so apparently
unjust as to shock the conscience. "If the rule as to adequacy
of consideration is to be .adhered to, it would seem that when
the thing promised is of an indeterminate value, even a nominal
consideration, such as one dollar, would sustain the promise. How-
ever, the rule is generally stated to be that where the considera-
tion is so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, courts
will interfere. But an examination of the cases shows that this
has scarcely ever been done, unless the inadequacy was coupled
with circumstances of fraud or oppression, or of advantage taken
of some relation of trust or dependence. The inadequacy of
itself may be so flagrant as to raise a presumption of fraud.' '20
239 Fed. 928.
237 U. S. (Ill.) 101, 116.
42 Utah 510, 134 Pac. 573.
13177 Pac. (Okla.) 86.
3 Litt. 234.
206 R. C. L. 679.
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Such is the case in Federal Oil Co. v. Western 0i Co.,21 where
it was said that, "A lease, for the nominal consideration of $1.00,
for the purpose of drilling and operating for oil and gas, the
lessor to receive a certain proportion of the oil and gas obtained,
which does not obligate the lessee to commence or prosecute such
operations, and which he may terminate at his pleasure without
compensation to the lessor, is unconscionable and should not be
enforced."
Though the books are full of dicta and many generaliza-
tions, there are in reality few cases dealing squarely with the
subject of nominal consideration, especially with the sufficiency
of the recital of one dollar consideration in deeds and convey-
ances. Usually there are other elements entering into the case,
such as, mistake or fraud, or, other supporting promises and
covenants. Ordinarily, the general attitude of the courts, re-
fusing to interfere with the contracts and dealings of men who
are presumed to know and understand what they are doing
better than the courts and who may have their own hidden mo-
tives for so dealing with one another, seems to be the fairest and
the most reasonable view.
21112 Fed. 373.
